

THE EU TRANSPORT POLICY AND THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

Fleischer, Tamás¹

MESSAGE²

While the European Union transport policies traditionally have dealt first of all with global, international and continent level axes and harmonisation, the main message of this study still relates to the local and country level tasks of Turkey. To ensure an accession to the European transport network also useful for Turkey at a local (urban and suburban) level the main suggested task is to create a clear social picture about the directions of the local transport future, with special regard to the possibilities of decreasing the car dependency. As for the country level, the most important is to prepare a transport strategy that makes clear, what kind of transport structure and strategy is needed for the future development of Turkey

The continental level interconnections are also important, but able to bring advantages only if the absorption capacity of the country is given. At that context it is an important task to study the EU transport policy, to see what can the EU network offer for Turkey – and what Turkey can promise in an exchange.

¹ Centre of Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for World Economy 1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. Phone: (36-30) 848 7070, e-mail tamas.fleischer@krtk.mta.hu

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INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on two different changes of the European Union transport policy of the last two decades. The first change is more evident: together with the enlargement process: the transport policy covers bigger and bigger EU areas, more and more member states – starting with 12 in 1992 arriving to 27 in 2011 (when the last transport White Paper was published) and 28 by 2013.

The other significant change is the widening of the contents of the policy. There is a tendency from focusing to continental and EU-wide interconnection elements and harmonisation issues towards also covering country- and urban level transport issues – following a recognition that the EU competitiveness and catching-up problems can't be solved without this deeper context of the transport policies.

The structure of this paper is the following. The first part of the study introduces the development of the EU transport policy and also the enlargement process of the TEN-T network in the recent two decades, pointing out the main issues and problems of the respective period. The paper then presents more detailed the last EU transport policy and the new decisions and plans to assure the connection and harmonisation with the enlargement area. The paper also compares the earlier expectations towards the effects of the transport networks with the effects achieved. To summarise the two decade development of the transport strategy approach of the EU, the last table repeats the main policy decisions classing them by the territorial range the policy aimed to affect.

EARLY PLANS FOR MOTORWAY INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND TURKEY

Before arriving to the EU transport policies, it is important to remember, that from the seventies on, there was already an attempt and support to establish a corridor system behind the iron curtain (“behind” from western European point of view). This was the so-called Trans-European North-South Motorway network TEM (Hantak 2007). The denomination shows, that in the beginning the plan related to the Eastern-Central and Southern European (ECSE) region (where the corridor was really followed the North-South direction), still soon the corridor was prolonged towards Turkey turning here West-East rather.



Source: Hantak 2007

Figure 1. Trans-European North-South Motorway (TEM) Network

Relative to the more than three decade preparation work it can be said, that nothing really important has happened as a consequence of this issue. What is more interesting, since the early 90s change of the political status of the ECSE countries the whole North-South connection problem became secondary or even unimportant in the shadow of the urged East-West connections.

Why was still proposed and urged earlier that TEM project by international bodies as UN-ECE? Looking at the map (*Figure 1*) it is possible, that there was a hidden strategic vision behind the plan: namely to build a corridor along the borders of the Sovietunion where the movement of different troops becomes easier. The better interconnection of the countries touched was an officially declared, but not really supported and financed target – and perhaps both with the disintegration of the Sovietunion and with the change of the strategic considerations the project become unimportant, even dysfunctional in a different geopolitical situation.

Anyhow, the EU transport policy didn't base any decision on that earlier project, but opened a totally new page in the corridor thinking in the negotiations of the extension period.

FROM EARLY EU IDEAS TO THE FIRST COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY IN 1992

The need for a common European transport policy was mooted when the Treaty of Rome was being written, but Future Development of a Common Transport Policy (CTP 1992), the first Union White Paper on the subject, did not appear until 1992. It had been preceded by numerous regulations or guidelines of a transport nature, but their common attribute had only been a concern with creating *competition neutrality*. They included such important measures as scrapping of ship cargo capacity, mandatory rest periods for vehicle drivers, and similar matters, but they did not amount to a single *transport-policy approach*. The Single European Act of 1986 was still motivated by desires for undisturbed domestic trade and undistorted competition while still it formulated expectations of common European networks..

Arriving to the policy level, two target areas for common transport policy were emphasized. One was a comprehensive measure to encompass the earlier moves to do with competition regulation, i. e. to alter the distinct state, regulatory and monopoly conditions that reduce permeability in day-to-day operation of transport. The other was to provide physical conditions for expanding connections between the 12 (soon the 15) member states. Both were expressed well in the guiding principle of the 1992 Common Transport Policy (CTP 1992) as a “single network for a single market”. The EU, seeking to exploit existing potentials fully, sought to work first on the plane of linking up existing networks and institutions in adjacent countries, to which member-states had been paying little heed. This led to the appearance of the TEN—the Trans-European Network—providing EU-level trunk connections not only in transport (TEN-T), but also in energy (TEN-E) and telecommunications (TEN-C). The EU laid down in 1996 the guidelines and key elements of the TEN-T network. Thereafter the focus shifted from the network rather to completing 14 *priority projects* connected with realizing this.

Summarising the comments it can be said that in the early periode the EU confined itself to the EU-wide problems of the transport activity like the competition neutrality, the harmonisation of the rules and the common network between the member states; not really dealing with the country and settlement level problems or with wider global problems of the transport.

EXTENDING TEN-T: THE SYSTEM OF PAN-EUROPEAN CORRIDORS

The EU transport policy adopted in 1992 certainly did reflect the image of Europe prevalent in the period (the later 1980s) when the policy was formulated. By the time the ideas became Union documents in the 1990s, the map of Europe had changed. In 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Iron Curtain disappeared, and it became clear one had to think in terms of a larger Europe. The process of approving the TEN-T-concepts had been taking its Union course, but parallel with that, there

began in 1991 a process of negotiations called the Pan-European transport conference, in which (1991: Prague, 1994: Crete, 1997: Helsinki) delegates of respective transport ministries accepted plans for so-styled “Helsinki corridors” or “Pan-European corridors”, i. e. the Eastern extension of the TEN-T.

What did that imply? *Figure 2* shows the scheme of the TEN-T network of the 1990s with interlocking internal corridors covering the area of the EU 15:




Figure 2. The scheme of the TEN-T network

Eastern extension of the TEN-T would give a network like *Figure 3*, extending the same type of grid network to a wider area.




Figure 3. The extended TEN-T network

But this did not happen. No doubt in the euphoria of the 1990s, improving East–West relations seemed on both sides to be the task, and this effort clouded longer-term thinking. Priority was given only to extending the main East–West corridors (*Figure 4*).




Figure 4. Schematic extension of the East-West corridors

In the event, this East–West was less schematic than *Figure 4* portrays, partly because Europe becomes wider to the East, and partly because there was Western demand for links to the north-east from Italy and south-east from Germany too. This produced something like *Figure 5*, which may even be called a network, but still displays a different pattern from the original TEN-T network designed to *improve internal connections* among the EU 15 countries.





Figure 5. Extension of the East-West corridors of the TEN-T network

In the actual Pan-European network there were no North–South corridors except Corridor 9 (Finland to Greece), only ones going east from the EU 15, then veering north or south (*Figure 6*). The North–South connections established by this are clearly more accidental than planned. At any rate, whatever has emerged is remote from the original intention of a grid network to balance spatial inequalities.³



Source KTI – GKM <http://www.gkm.gov.hu/data/8568/Image11.gif>

Figure 6. The Pan-European (PEC; or Helsinki) Corridors

³ Even later some EU documents have not progressed beyond the unilateral effort described here. See White Paper on Services of General Interest. COM(2004) 374 final. Commission for the European Communities, Brussels, 12. 5. 2004. 3. 3. „...the Commission’s policy in the area of Trans-European Networks is improving access to transport, energy and communications networks in the more remote area and will assist in *linking the new Members States with the infrastructure of the Fifteen...*” (this author’s italics).

Apart from the ten Helsinki corridors, four Pan-European transport areas (PET-RAs) were also delineated, as bases for water navigation.

Summarizing the statements on the creation of the Pan-European network, while the original idea of the TEN-T network was the better multilateral cooperation between all the member-states of the Union, the extended network structure linked rather the new territories to the earlier grid, than would offer an equally multilateral grid at an extended area.

EXTENSION OF THE PAN-EUROPEAN CORRIDORS AS THE TINA NETWORK 1999

The development of the Pan-European network to link with the East-West elements of TEN-T led to a realisation after the first happiness waned that the Pan-European corridors are far from meeting the demands for inter-regional and supra-national transport connections that emerge in the area brought in by enlargement.. For instance, no single Pan-European corridor crosses the East-West borderline between Slovakia and Hungary anywhere to the East of Bratislava – a section more than 600 km long. Because of such problems the so-called Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA 1999) process was launched in 1995, still at the time of the series of the Pan-European conferences. In this framework the transport experts of the EU 15 gave professional advice to high-level transport administrations of the candidate countries on how to assess their transport infrastructural needs. The 1999 closing report slipped from advice to declaration of further corridors, and defined network elements with primary and secondary priority. The primary corridors – to the glory of the methodological knowledge transferred – were unanimously acclaimed, or at least voted for “without visible opposition”: they should be identical with the Helsinki corridors evolved by that time. (TINA 1999). It was never clearly defined what secondary priority meant, but it offered always the danger of having less chance for getting EU Cohesion Fund support relative to the construction of priority network element.

TIME TO DECIDE: WHITE PAPER FOR TRANSPORT POLICY IN 2001

Nine years after the first White Paper came a newer EU transport policy in September 2001 (White Paper 2001). As the document reviewed the mixed results, by that time the competitive-market aims were largely fulfilled—consumer prices fell, service quality improved, technology spread, and the closed transport markets were opened up (except for rail)—but the more general dysfunctional features had not been alleviated. The uneven spatial development remained and so did congestion at the centre, while shortcomings in provision in remoter areas remained typical of the Union as a whole. (“Apoplexy in the centre and paralysis at the extremities” as the documentum wrote). There was congestion on main roads and railways, in cities and

in the air, mounting health and environmental damage, and shocking accident figures.

The 2001 White Paper built the environmental recommendations of the 1990s into its proposals, and aimed to ensure that the quantity of traffic would not rise together with economic development (“decoupling”). It expressed the purpose of curbing the increase in road traffic by three means: (1) pricing and regulation in the road sector, (2) improving the efficiency of other means of transport, so that they could offer an alternative to road, and (3) in the meantime executing some necessary investment projects in the infrastructure. These infrastructural developments were automatically associated with the TEN-T network, in a slightly reconsidered, re-examined form.

The tasks of implementing the White Paper were designated in 60 measures in four blocks: (1) changes in the proportions between transport modes, (2) elimination of bottlenecks, (3) development of a user-centred transport policy, and (4) handling the globalization of transport.

All in all, the 2001 White Paper made a significant step forward in its principles. It recognized that for progress in EU transport, it would not suffice to concentrate on inter-country links. Transport-policy objectives had to be harmonized in depth and outlook. It revised the approach of the 1990s and came out firmly for change in environmental and social matters.

RE-EXAMINATION OF THE TEN-T PRINCIPLES (2004) AND FURTHER EXTENSIONS

As introduced above, the 2001 White Paper seemed to confirm the new investments to be governed to the TEN-T network. But implementation of the decided 14 projects was badly delayed, and it became clear that most of them were not receiving the kind of priority in each member-state that would allow EU contributions with a ceiling of 10 per cent to provide any incentive to complete them.

In 2003, a committee chaired by the Union’s earlier transport commissioner presented recommendations for revising TEN-T (Van Miert Report 2003). It stated that improving the execution of the projects called for changes in the TEN-T guidelines and the appointment of coordinators for each, along with a higher EU financial contribution. It went on to propose further new projects alongside the uncompleted ones.

The re-examination of the TEN-T guidelines was clearly not concerned with designating the network, revising its structure or envisaging an expanded area (or the problems raised by this). It dealt mainly with the TEN-T guidelines for priority projects, above all with making the implementation run more smoothly.

The report passed through the Union's bureaucratic forums relatively quickly and was endorsed by the Commission on April 29, 2004, just two days before the accession of the ten new member states.. It gave priority to 30 projects instead of 14 and raised the EU financial contribution from 10 per cent to 20. (Decision 884/2004/EC) and (Corrigendum to the Decision 884/2004/EC).

This treatment of the extension corridors as appendices of the earlier accepted TEN-T elements did not mark a break with 1997 or delineation of the Helsinki corridors. A document on the transport infrastructure of the Balkans that appeared in 2002 (TIRS—Transport Infrastructure Study in Balkans) and covered seven countries in that time (ALB, B-H, BG, CR, SR-M, MAC, RO) laid down that the basic network in Bulgaria and Romania is identical with the corridors decided earlier in the TINA process, while for the other countries, the European Investment Bank (EIB) conducted a survey (Western Balkans Transport Infrastructure Inventory) that named and categorized financially 223 potential projects (TIRS 2002).

The next process, beginning in 2005, took the new neighbourly relations of the EU 27 into account in designating further “transnational axes” labelled “North”, “Central”, “South-East” and “South West”, with the “maritime highways” as the fifth axis (*Figure 7* and *Guidelines 2007*). As *Figure 7* shows the latter two, namely the South-West Axe and the maritime highways are the ones that were promising connections between the Union's area and Turkey.

Summarising these processes concerning the Balkans region one may state that:

- It was the effect of networks determined elsewhere in an inter-regional context that was becoming dominant on this territory, as contrasted to planning based on the assertion of intra-regional contexts.*
- Due to the prioritised point of the possibility of financing individual projects, it was only the formerly evolved structures and elements of the network that could be strengthened by corrections, and the chance of creating new structures vanished.*



Source: Guidelines 2007. Guidelines for transport in Europe and neighbouring regions

Figure 7. Five transnational axes to assist trade and regional integration

RE-EXAMINATION OF THE WHITE PAPER (2006): ROAD HAULAGE STRIKES BACK?

While the 2001 transport policy stressed a definite need to halt growth in transport performance and slow the increase in road traffic, the re-examination (Keep Europe moving 2006) can be considered as a significant withdrawal.

It has been noted that the 2001 White Paper examined the mistakes made and stressed the need for significant change. The re-examination in 2006 underlined the continuity of basic principles in transport policy, so reversing the clear turn (“Time to decide”) to environmental friendliness.

The White Paper had pointed out how the share of road transport was still rising despite efforts to curb it. The re-examination saw this as an achievement: “*The internal market has contributed to creating competitive international road haulage and increasingly also rail operations. Moreover, the last five years have seen the effects of globalisation leading to the creation of large logistics companies with worldwide operations.*” (Keep Europe moving 2006 p. 5.).

The White Paper had talked of curbing the increase in volume (separating economic growth from traffic growth). The re-examination also sought to separate, but

in a different sense: “*Mobility must be disconnected from its negative side effects*”, means ensuring traffic growth rather, not curbing it.. (*ibid* p. 4.).

The principles of the White Paper had seen the curbing of road transport and intervention to that end as a policy task. The re-examination was concerned “*to optimise each mode’s own potential*”, which would mean just avoiding intervention between them. (*ibid* p. 4.). The new document also defined optimization goals (“*each transport mode must be optimised*”, and “*the efficient use of different modes on their own ... will result in an optimal and sustainable utilisation of resources.*”) where these did not tie in with sectorally integrated policy-level assignments. (*ibid*. p. 21.). Rather than openly rescinding the earlier interventionist objectives (*shifting the balance between modes*), it did so in effect by its omissions. Yet although it surrounded it with provisos, the re-examination nonetheless declared that “*sustainable mobility policy therefore needs to build on a broader range of policy tools achieving shifts to more environmentally friendly modes where appropriate, especially on long distance, in urban areas and on congested corridors*” (*ibid*. p. 21.).

Such sentence in the re-examination as: “*The efforts to achieve the goals of meeting growing mobility needs and strict environmental standards are beginning to show signs of friction.*” (*ibid*. p. 29.). sought to imply quite strongly that strict environmental protection should be restored

*So in general, the 2006 re-examination of the 2001 EU White Paper on transport diverged strongly from the progressive line taken in the previous one, while trying to emphasize continuity by omitting to say so openly.*⁴

THE 2011 WHITE PAPER ON EU TRANSPORT POLICY

The main document of this new transport policy is a 30-page White Paper (COM(2011) 144 final), which makes its main points in 68 paragraphs, accompanied by an appendix of 40 initiatives.

The focus objectives of the White Paper are the emission cuts and the construction of a uniform European network. The White Paper derives its main objectives from important EU documents. One is the EU 2020 Strategy (COM(2010) 2020), from which the White Paper draws its *sustainability goals*. The other basic document is the Maastricht Treaty (1992), of which only the impact assessment is quoted ex-

⁴ Another consideration: the 2001 White Paper, published on September 12, 2001, evidently prepared before 9/11, and arrived in a world where the globalization processes would be reappraised and neo-conservative and fundamentalist schools of thought become stronger (especially outside Europe and the EU). This had its effect on Europe, even though the underlying ideology was felt less strongly.

plicitly (Impact assessment SEC(2011) 358, paragraphs 90-93). This is the source for the objectives concerning the *single Europe*, completing of the internal market, and the free movement of goods.

The reference base of the *overall policy objective* of the document is that a sustainable transport system is considered to be as a key to the attainment of the goals of the EU 2020 strategy—smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This calls for radical change compared with present practice. Among the economically, socially and environmentally undesirable effects to be averted are congestion, oil-dependency, accidents, emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, noise, and fragmentation of territory. *Three specific transport policy goals* for achieving the overall objective are mentioned: to reduce transport-related carbon dioxide emissions by 60 per cent by 2050, to reduce oil dependency substantially, and to erect barriers to increasing congestion.

Far isn't so clearly based the other objective of the document, the construction of the network for a uniform Europe. The aims derived from the mentioned implicit reference to the Maastricht Treaty. The question is whether in 2011 the EU 27 (or in 2013 the EU 28) can follow blindly a paradigm that starts out from 1992. Whether the transport White Paper should be aiming at a *uniform and homogenous Europe*, in a period, when it is increasingly clear that there are different patterns of regions within the EU that vary widely in their development level, with their various problems to be solved. With small differences in development level it is possible to equalize regions by linking them together, but with large differences this is at best questionable, indeed the differences may be perpetuated or actually increase. (The way strong linkage may heighten development differences appears similarly in the role played by the common currency.)

If strong linkage of regions at different development levels exceeds the rate at which they can catch up (in their economies, societies, internal cooperation, systems of institutions, local systems of ties, etc.), the improving external links fail to exert the expected beneficial effect, – just as the common currency system has not proved to be a catch-up panacea either.

The problem is not the catch-up objective, but the application of the earlier used tools to regions with two, three or fourfold differences of development level. What seems to be needed is an intermediate step of *deepening relations among groups of countries at similar or close economic and social levels* and establishing the transport links within *macro-regions* accordingly, rather than promoting an abstract, theoretical uniform system. (Unfortunately the present EU concept of a macro-region works against that. Designating a non-homogenous region such as the EU Danube Region for an area from Baden-Württemberg to Ukraine undermines the potential utility of the concept for the EU.)

There is a similar danger in putting forward a transport White Paper that bases its strategy on a formal unit, a vision with no reality behind it. We should be reinterpreting the cohesion strategy and combating such formal uniformity. The need is to adjust the revised transport policy to the realities.

Going back to the three specific transport policy objectives of the document, (reduce carbon dioxide emissions, reduce oil dependency, and decrease congestion) the White Paper designates three strands of development to achieve those goals. Intervention in *vehicle and fuel technology* is the first, innovations for the *multi-modal chains and modal changes* are the second, and *information systems, traffic management and market-compatible economic methods* to facilitate more efficient infrastructure use are the third. Later the document uses these blocs to enumerate its more detailed ten development goals.

Ten goals for obtaining the transport policy goals	Urban, suburban	Macro-regional (medium, 300–800 km)	EU-wide and continental	Global and intercontinental
Vehicle and fuel technology	(1) Phase out conventionally fuelled cars in cities			(2) Reduce maritime emissions by 40%, low-carbon fuel planes achieve 40% share in fleet
Multi-modal chains and modal shift		(3) 30% of > 300km road freight to another mode by 2030; 50% by 2050 (4b) Goods medium distance on rail by 2050	(4a) More high speed rail by 2030 (5) TEN-T core network by 2030; more capacity by 2050	(6) Rail provision for airports and ports by 2050
Information systems, traffic management		(8) Multimodal information and management payment systems		(7) Transport management systems for air, land, water by 2020 + Galileo
Safety,			(9) 0 fatalities by 2050	
Market-based incentives			(10) User/polluter pays; harmful subsidies = 0	

Source of data: COM(2011) 144 final. Ten goals in Section 2.5.

Table 1. Ten goals for obtaining the transport policy goals of the White Paper

Table 1 presents the ten development goals of the transport policy, using the above mentioned strands in rows, while another point was added to the picture. An

important part of the document and of its background studies were the distinguished transport segments by the length of the trips (urban trips, medium-sized trips and global, intercontinental trips) also showing how these segments were responsible for the total emissions of the transport. Using that integrated transport approach we distinguished the development goals to see if they relate to the EU-wide inter-regional (“continental”) cooperation level, or rather relate to local (urban-suburban) level, or intermediate (“macro-region”) level or global (intercontinental) level transport (see the columns of the table). Our statement is, that the majority of the transport problems that have to be solved for a better (smart, sustainable and inclusive etc.) operation of the EU needs solutions at a level that differ from the EU-wide one. The only goals remained at the EU level covered the TEN-T constructions including the high-speed rail network, while all those goals that were originated really from the overall policy objectives and sustainability goals needed solutions at a different level.

Summarising the issue, the White Paper 2011 appeared to mark an environmental offensive, with aims of a 60 per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050; a fall in the use of traditional fuels in urban areas and a decrease in urban congestion. The objectives are coupled with ten development goals, and we could see that the achievement of these targets needs local level, regional level, and also global (intercontinental) level solutions and influence, not just EU-wide measurements.

The other priority objective of attaining a Single European Transport Area remains unsupported and is not in harmony with the sustainability conditions or the White Paper’s system of goals. Part of the reason is that the uniformity issue has never been maintained, re-examined or adjusted to the real conditions of the EU since the 1992 treaty.

2009...2013.. REVISION OF THE TEN-T NETWORK

While the main policy background of the 2011 White Paper has been shifted to future environmental, security, energy, technology and cooperation problems, and clearly open its interest and activity towards urban and regional issues, the construction of the TEN-T network is a permanent target of the European investments. The newest revision of the TEN-T network has been started in 2009 and after four years the process is still open. The main ideas, as to distinguish core and comprehensive level of the network, to concentrate on the development of a core network instead of constructing dispersed (14 or 30) projects had already been part of the first debated paper in 2009, still the process seems to be endless. In 2011 a paper (TEN-T proposal COM(2011) 650 final) has been issued on the Union guidelines for the development of the Trans-European Transport Network, but another two years needed to get closer to an agreement (Agreement on TEN-T 2013) and still doesn’t mean necessarily the end of the process. As the press release writes *“This agreement, reached in triologue negotiations between the European Parliament, Council and European Commission,*

must be formally approved by the European Parliament Plenary and Council.” The official statement welcome the simple fact that should have already been the base of the past two decades of the policy: *“The new EU infrastructure policy aims at creating a real network and no longer focuses on isolated projects”*. Naturally it was not this statement that caused the problems and delays but the selection and agreement on the single corridors. *“The guidelines contain precise maps of the network which has been identified on the basis of an objective methodology.”* Great number of annexes present the maps, two of them relates to Turkey (Annexes 29 May 2013)



Source: Annexes 29 May 2013

**Figure 8. Indicative Extension to Neighbouring Countries:
Comprehensive Network: Railways and airports Türkiye**

So this time it was not the isolated projects, but the single corridors instead that diverted the attention from the comprehensive global thinking towards local issues. The *comprehensive* network was able to take in the intentions of the different countries, while the *core network* was protected by that from overdosed demands.




Source: Annexes 29 May 2013

Figure 9. Indicative Extension to Neighbouring Countries: Comprehensive Network: Roads, ports, rail-road terminals and airports Türkiye

A SURVEY ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE CONNECTIONS

After more than twenty years of common European transport policy declarations it is time to look at the results. Naturally the real objectives of the common transport policies point behind the transport issue: economic close up, competitiveness catch-up would be the real Union-wide result. But understanding that these problems need longer development (and that perhaps not the interconnection problem was the key issue in the lack of the results) let's see the outcomes in the quality of the connections. Attila Lüttmerding and Matthias Gather in a brand-new study evaluated the quality of the passenger train connections on the main corridors of the European rail network. (Lüttmerding – Gather 2013)

Figure 10 presents the rude data, the number of daily connections (including the ties with necessary changes). Already the frequency of the possibility the access a region from another shows a definite hole between the eastern and western part of Europe. Not only the North-South connections are missing in the Eastern-Central European area (that was kept back in the decisions, as we could see earlier) – but there is still a huge gap in the East-West connections, that was highlighted in construction plans.



Source: Lüttmerding, Attila – Gather, Matthias (2013) see p. 9.

Figure 10. Number of trains on Tuesday, 20th of March 2012, from 3 a.m. to 3 a.m. next day

The authors worked out a more precise quality indicator combined the frequency of the link and the speed of the access, and the gap become even more visible. (ibid. p. 23.) Knowing that the rail connection is just one part of the picture, and that the results are good for standing hypotheses rather than drawing final consequence, still worthy to underline, that the step-by-step improvement of the neighbour relations and a regional construction of the better cooperation seems to be the realistic and promising development of the relations. The Europe-wide good ties are perhaps sooner able to be constructed on prospering regional contacts, than instead of them.

SUMMARY

The paper surveyed the twenty years development of the European Union transport policy. The main objective was to help the cooperation among the member states, and by that to promote achieving the wider social and economic objectives of the Union. During that period the number of the member-states more than doubled, the differences between the development level of the states and regions within the EU increased even more. The simple target of interconnecting the regions and by that achieve the equalisation between the development of the regions seems to be much more far away now than twenty years earlier. The policy itself changed a lot and takes account the local transport circumstances and specialities much more; it is a

question when and how the idea of the TEN-T will be able also change and framed to the altering situation.

Documents / years	Local urban & suburban	Country-wide or Macro-regional (cc.100–800 km)	EU-wide / continental	Global & intercontinental
before 1992			Specific sub-sector targets; competition balancing	
1992 CTP		harmonisation of state regulations	„Single network to a single market” + TEN-T	(keep up with USA & Japan/E-Asia)
1996 TEN-T			TEN-Guidelines + emphasis on 14 priority projects	
1991–94–97 PEC				Pan-European (Helsinki) Corridors
1995–99 TINA				TINA densified secondary network for accessing countries
2001 WP „Time to Decide”	Users in the heart of transport policy ←	Breaking the link between economic growth and transport growth Reduction in mobility Decreasing road transport + TEN-T		Managing the globalisation of transport
2002 TIRS & 2003 REBIS				Transport Infrastructure Regional Study in the Balkans
2004 (29 Apr.) TEN-T Guidelines			← 30 priority projects →	
2006 WP review „Keep Europe Moving”		“Optimise each mode’s own potential” „Mobility must be disconnected from its negative side-effects”		
2007 Guidelines for Europe and neighboring regions:				Extension of trans-European transport axes to neighboring countries and regions.
2011 WP ...to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system	WP development goals No (1), (9) and (10).	WP development goals No (3), (4b), (8), (9) and (10).	60 % GHG emiss. reduc. by 2050; reducing oil dependency; barriers to increasing congestion + „single European transport area” WP goals (4a) and (5).	WP development goals No (2), (6), (7), (9) and (10).
2010...12.. EU TEN-T Guidelines ...	Identification of urban main modes		Dual layer approach: core & comprehensive network... +core network corridors	Adequate connections to neighbouring and third countries
Lessons for Turkey	(1) Create clear social picture about local transport future: the possibilities of decreasing car dependency	(2) Preparation of a transport strategy: what kind of transport structure and strategy is needed for the future development of Turkey?	(4) Studying the EU transport policy, to see what can the EU offer for Turkey – and what Turkey can promise to the EU	(3) Studying needs/ offers of the EU for external relations

Table 2. How the transport policy goals of the EU policy documents were extended in the past two decades from inter-regional level to other levels

The *Table 2* repeats the main characteristics of the introduced transport policies and corridor suggestions, but also underlines the development, as the new policies covered more different levels of the transport issues from urban and country level to regional and global ones.

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